Alfred Lilienthal
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
July 1 [illegible], 1981
REVIEWED BY Wolf JC DATE 5/28/82
RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED ☑ RELEASABLE ☑
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The Honorable Alexander Haig
The Secretary of State
Washington D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Iraq Nuclear Reactor

The French Government has declared its willingness to rebuild the OSIRAK reactor destroyed by Israel. Israel has been censored for not having first exhausted all diplomatic approaches for obtaining assurance that the reactor would not serve the clandestine production of nuclear weapons.

In the light of President Reagan's recent policy announcement that efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental foreign policy objective it seems clearly indicated this country expresses to France its disapproval.

The testimony of Under Secretary Stoessel that the Osirak reactor did not clearly sustain the assumption that it was meant for the production of nuclear weapons can hardly be taken as the final assessment of the State Department. A solid fact may often be established by inference.

In view of the generally conceded deficiencies of IAEA safeguards neither France nor Italy can pretend that a new OSIRAK will serve peaceful purposes only.

Sincerely yours

Alfred Lilienthal

cc: Letter to The New York Times.

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Washington

July 10, 1981

Dear Mr. Eilan:

I appreciate your June 19, 1981 letter in which you requested that a U.S. technical team visit Baghdad for [illegible] specific discussions. Owing to the sensitivity of this issue in the Mideast and the international community, however, we do not believe it would be useful for a U.S. delegation to make such a trip, at this time.

It is important to highlight that in this instance the IAEA and its international safeguards system were not the basic concern of Israel. Rather, in spite of safeguards and the warning they might have given to potential Iraqi actions to divert nuclear material from civil uses, the Israelis presumably doubted that the international response to an Iraqi nuclear weapons program would have protected the interests of Israel. In that regard, the Israel bombing was fundamentally part of the unresolved conflict in the Mideast in which neither the IAEA or the NPT were central.

Sincerely,

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

Dist. to:
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S/S
S/S-S
PM
NP
EUR
NEA
OES
AE(Deb)

Mr. Richard Wilson
Professor of Physics
Energy and Environmental Policy Center
[illegible] University